Helmuth von Moltke was born in
Mecklenburg-Schwerin and named after his uncle,
Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke, future
Field Marshal and hero of the
Wars of Unification. During the
Franco-Prussian War Moltke served with the 7th Grenadier Regiment, and was cited for bravery. He attended the War Academy between 1875 and 1878 and joined the General Staff in 1880. In 1882 he became personal adjutant to his uncle, then Chief of the General Staff. In 1891, on the death of his uncle, Moltke became aide-de-camp to
Wilhelm II, thus becoming part of the Emperor's inner circle. In the late 1890s he commanded first a brigade and then a division, finally being promoted to Lieutenant General in 1902.
In 1904 Moltke was made Quartermaster-General; in effect, Deputy Chief of the General Staff. In 1906, he became chief on Schlieffen's retirement. His appointment was controversial then and remains so today. The other likely candidates for the position were
Hans Hartwig von Beseler, Karl von Bülow, and
Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz. Critics charge that Moltke gained the position on the strength of his name and his friendship with the Kaiser. Certainly Moltke was far closer to the Kaiser than the other candidates. Historians argue, however, that Beseler was too close to Schlieffen to have succeeded him, while Bülow and Goltz were too independent for Wilhelm to have accepted them. Indeed, Moltke's friendship with the Kaiser permitted him latitude with his majesty that others could not have enjoyed. It should be noted that Goltz, at least, saw nothing wrong with Moltke's performance as Chief.
During the Marne Campaign of 1914, Moltke's health broke down and he was succeeded by
Erich von Falkenhayn. It is a matter of debate whether the failure of the Marne Campaign can be placed at Moltke's feet. A number of historians, notably Zuber and S.L.A. Marshall, contend that the failure of
Alexander von Kluck's First Army to keep position with
Karl von Bülow's Second Army, thus creating a gap near
Paris that was exploited by the French, is a more direct cause than any planning foibles on Moltke's part. The Schlieffen School disagrees, and argues that Moltke lost control of the invading armies during the month of August and thus was unable to react when the
First Battle of the Marne developed in September. While Moltke had lost effective touch with his field commanders, German operational doctrine had always stressed personal initiative on the part of subordinate officers, more so than in other armies. Other historians argue that the multitude of strategic options Moltke faced, and the danger of the Russian invasion of East Prussia clouded Moltke's judgement.
Moltke's health continued to deteriorate and he died in Berlin on
June 18, 1916.
