The most notable act of Peel's second ministry, however, was the one that would bring it down. This time Peel moved against the landholders by repealing the
Corn Laws, which supported agricultural revenues by restricting grain imports. This radical break with Conservative protectionism was triggered by the
Great Irish Famine (1845-1849). At first sceptical of the extent of the problem, Peel reacted slowly to the famine. As realisation dawned, however, he hoped that ending the Corn Laws would free up more food for the Irish. Though he knew repealing the laws would mean the end of his ministry, Peel decided to do so. Yet many historians believe that Peel merely used the Irish Famine as an excuse to repeal the Corn Laws, having been an intellectual convert to free trade since the 1820s. Blake points out that if Peel was convinced that total repeal was necessary to stave off the famine, he should have enacted a bill that brought about immediate temporary repeal, not permanent repeal over a three-year period of gradual tapering-off of duties. His own party failed to support the bill, but it passed with Whig and Radical support on
29 June 1846. A following bill was defeated as a direct consequence, however, and Peel resigned.
As an aside in reference to the Repeal of the Corn Laws, Peel did make some moves to subsidise the purchase of food for the Irish, but this attempt was small and had little tangible effect. In the age of
laissez-faire, government taxes were small, and subsidies or direct economic interference were almost non-existent. That subsidies were actually given was very much out of character for the political times; Peel's successor,
Lord John Russell, has received more criticism than Peel has on Irish policy. The repeal of the Corn Laws was more political than humanitarian. Peel's support for free trade could already be seen in his 1842 and 1845 budgets; in late
1842 Graham wrote to Peel that "the next change in the Corn Laws must be to an open trade", while arguing that the government should not tackle the issue. Speaking to the cabinet in
1844, Peel argued that the choice was maintenance of the
1842 Corn Law or total repeal. Whatever the intentions, in the end the repeal of the Corn Laws had little effect on the situation in Ireland.
The historian
Boyd Hilton argues that Peel knew from 1844 that he was going to be deposed as Conservative leader—many of his MPs had taken to voting against him and the rupture within the party between liberals and paternalists which had been so damaging in the 1820s, but masked by the issue of reform in the 1830s was brought to the surface over the Corn Laws. Hilton's hypothesis is that Peel wished to actually be deposed on a liberal issue so that he might later lead a Peelite/Whig/Liberal alliance.