Hafez al-Assad ( '''') (October 6, 1930 – June 10, 2000) was president of Syria for three decades. Assad's rule stabilized and consolidated the power of the country's central government after decades of coups and counter-coups. He was succeeded by his son and current president Bashar al-Assad in 2000.

Hafez al-Assad was born in the town of Qardaha in the Latakia province of western Syria into a minority Alawite family. He was the first member of his family to attend high school. He attended Jules Jammal High School in Lattakia from which he graduated. He joined the Baath Party in 1946 at the age of 16. Because his family had no money to send him to university, Assad went to the Syrian Military Academy (where he met Mustafa Tlass) and received a free higher education. He showed considerable talent and the military sent him for additional training in the Soviet Union. As a pilot during the 1950s, he flew the Gloster Meteor jet fighter, amongst other types. He rose through the ranks and became an important figure in the military.

He opposed the 1958 union between Syria and Egypt which created the United Arab Republic (UAR). Stationed in Cairo, he worked with other officers to end the union, sticking to his pan-Arab ideals while arguing that the UAR concentrated too much power in the hands of the Gamal Abdel Nasser's regime. As a result, Assad was briefly imprisoned by the Egyptian authorities at the breakup of the union in 1961. Tlass escorted his family to Syria, where he later rejoined them.

In the chaos that followed the dissolution of the UAR, a coalition of left-wing groups led by the Baath Party seized power in Syria. Assad was appointed head of the airforce in 1964. The state was officially ruled by Amin Hafiz, a Sunni Muslim, but was in practice dominated by a coterie of young Alawite Baathists.

In 1966, the Baath launched a coup d'etat within the regime and cleared out the other parties from the government. Assad became Minister of Defence and wielded considerable influence over government policy. However, there was much tension between the dominant radical wing of the Baath Party, which promoted an aggressive foreign policy and rapid social reform, and Assad's more pragmatic, military-based faction. After being discredited by the failure of the Syrian military in the Six-Day War in 1967, and enraged by the aborted Syrian intervention in the Jordanian-Palestinian Black September war, the government faced conflict within its ranks. By the time President Nureddin al-Atassi and the de facto leader, deputy secretary general of the Baath Party Salah Jadid, realized the threat and ordered Assad and Tlass be stripped of all party and government power, it was too late. Assad swiftly launched a bloodless intra-party coup, The Corrective Revolution of 1970. The party was purged, Atassi and Jadid jailed, and Assad loyalists installed in key posts throughout the government.

Al-Assad inherited a dictatorial regime shaped by years of unstable military rule, and lately organized along one-party lines after the Baathist coup. He increased repression and attempted to secure his domination of every sector of society through a vast web of police informers and agents. Under his rule, Syria turned genuinely authoritarian. He was made the object of a state-sponsored cult of personality, which depicted as a wise, just, and strong leader of Syria and of the Arab world in general.

Syria under Assad never quite reached the levels of repression practiced in neighboring Iraq, ruled by a rivaling Baathist faction. Where Saddam Hussein's policies of perpetual state terrorism aimed to secure his rule through fear, Hafez al-Assad took a more sophisticated approach: rather than immediately brutalizing restive communities, his regime often bribed or threatened dissidents. Only after milder forms of persuasion had failed would swords come out. Then, the regime could be counted on to act with unflinching cruelty in order to intimidate all would-be dissidents.

Whilst dictatorial, the government of al-Assad initially achieved some popularity for bringing stability to the country, which had experienced dozens of attempted coups since 1948. He also implemented many social reforms and infrastructure projects, notably the Thawra (Revolution) dam on the Euphrates River. It was built with Soviet assistance, and still supplies much of Syria's electricity. Public schooling and other reforms were extended to larger segments of the population, and a notable rise in living standards occurred. The government's secularism meant that many members of religious minorities, such as the Alawites, Druze, and Christians, naturally supported Assad, fearing a return to historic persecution under a Sunni Islamist successor government to Assad.

Assad also continued previous Baath policies by overseeing massive increases in Syria's military strength (again with Soviet support) and by maintaining a strong Arab nationalist position. School curricula and the state-controlled media gave much attention to the glorious past of Syria and the Arabs, and portrayed al-Assad's government as the lone uncorrupted champion of the Arab nation against Western imperialism and aggression. This propaganda aimed to legitimize the government, but also to unify the diverse and fractured Syrian society, and instill a sense of national pride among the populace.

These policies were popular with the majority of the population, but the emphasis on '''uruba<i> (Arabism), also meant that the non-Arab populations faced discrimination. The biggest such population was the Kurds of northern Syria. Campaigns of Arabization led to tens of thousands of Kurds losing their Syrian citizenship, and only through military repression was the central government able to keep the lid on tensions in Syrian Kurdistan.

Assad worked continuously to ensure the preeminence of his own Alawite sect within the government, and Alawites were appointed to fill virtually all important government posts (a notable exception being Sunni Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass). This was probably less a case of religious or ethnic solidarity than an attempt to confine power to people close to Assad himself, but it simultaneously meant that the historically repressed Alawites became increasingly dependent on Assad. Many feared (and still fear) renewed marginalization and retribution from the majority Sunnis, Syria's historical rulers, should the Baath regime fall from power.

The concentration of power in the hands of a religious group comprising no more than 10% of the population meant that other groups felt increasingly excluded from power. Since political clout was also a valuable asset in trade and the economy, due to the corruption of the state apparatus and the government-dominated economy (which was formally socialist, but in reality a mixed system), the rising fortunes of the Alawites paid off in government spending in their areas of western Syria. As the lack of balance became more and more well-known, discontent grew among Sunnis.

Growing economic hardship among Sunni middle-class merchants in the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s fueled an increasing demand for economic and political reform. Many of these economically displaced and disenfranchised Sunni merchants found sympathy and support within the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Additionally, many conservative Sunnis considered the Alawites a heretical breakaway sect from Islam, and resented being ruled by such politicians; the top five members of Assad's regime were either Alawite or from his tribal clan. Assad's embrace of secularism and his alliance with the Soviet Union (intensely unpopular after its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979) increased tension between the government and the Sunni religious leadership. In the late 1970s, religious dissent became more and more pronounced, and the state's repressive policies pushed non-Islamist dissidents to join forces with groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. Religious fundamentalists portrayed the Syrian ruler as an enemy of Allah, an atheist, and even a Maronite (the latter being a Catholic rite whose militias were at that time fighting Sunnis in Lebanon). Step by step, the underground opposition turned violent, into a low-level insurrection, and the harsh military reprisals further escalated violence.

Throughout the early 1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood staged a series of bomb attacks against the government and its officials, including a nearly successful attempt to assassinate Assad on June 26, 1980, during an official state reception for the president of Mali. As a machine gun salvo missed him, Assad ran to kick a hand grenade aside, and his bodyguard sacrificed himself to smother the explosion of another one. Surviving with only light injuries, Assad's revenge was swift and ruthless; only hours later, his brother Rifaat al-Assad led a massacre of hundreds of imprisoned Islamists in Tadmor Prison http://hrw.org/reports/1996/Syria2.htm. Calls for vengeance grew within the Brotherhood, and bomb attacks increased in frequency. Events culminated with a general insurrection in the conservative Sunni town of Hama in February 1982. Islamists and other opposition activists proclaimed Hama a "liberated city" and urged Syria to rise up against the "infidel" ruler. Brotherhood fighters swept the city of Baathists, breaking into the homes of government employees and suspected supporters of the regime, killing about 50.

In the eyes of Assad, this was total war. The army was mobilized, and Hafez again sent Rifaat's special forces and Mukhabarat agents to the city. After encountering fierce resistance, they used artillery to blast Hama into submission. After a two-week battle, the town was securely in government hands. Then followed several weeks of torture and mass executions of suspected rebel sympathizers, killing many thousands, known as the Hama Massacre. Robert Fisk, who was in Hama shortly after the massacre, estimated that between 10,000 to 20,000 people were killed, but according to Thomas Friedman Rifaat later boasted of killing 38,000 people. Most of the old city was completely destroyed, including its palaces, mosques, ancient ruins, and the famous Azem Palace mansion.

The Islamist insurrection had been broken in Hama, and the Brotherhood has since then operated in exile. Government repression in Syria hardened considerably; Assad spent in Hama any goodwill he previously had left with the Sunni majority, and now was compelled to rely on brute force to remain in power.

In 1983, Assad suffered a heart attack and was confined to hospital. He named a six-man governing council to run the country in his absence, among them long-time Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass. Curiously, all of the six were Sunnis, possibly because that meant they had no independent power over his Alawite-dominated government, and were thus less likely to try to seize power. Despite this, rumors spread that Assad was dead or nearly so, and indeed his condition was very serious. In 1984, Rifaat al-Assad attempted to use the security forces under his control to seize power. His </i>Defence Company troops of some 50,000 men, complete with tanks and helicopters, began putting up roadblocks throughout Damascus, and tensions between Hafez loyalists and Rifaat supporters came close to all-out war. The stand-off was not ended until Hafez, still severely ill, rose from his bed to reassume power and speak to the nation. He then transferred command of the Defence Company<i> and, without formal accusations, sent Rifaat on an indefinite "work visit" to France.

Al-Assad's foreign policy was shaped by the relation of Syria to Israel, although this conflict both preceded him and persists after his death. During his presidency, Syria played a major role in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The war is, despite heavy losses and Israeli advances, presented by the Syrian government as a victory, as Syria regained some territory that had been occupied in 1967 through peace negotiations headed by Henry Kissinger. Since then Assad-led Syria has carefully respected the UN-monitored ceasefire line in the occupied Golan Heights. The Syria regime has denied the state of Israel any recognition, and long preferred to refer to it as a "Zionist Entity". Only in the mid-1990s did Hafez moderate his country's policy towards Israel, as he realized the loss of Soviet support meant a different balance of power in the Middle East. Pressed by the United States, he engaged in negotiations on the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, but these talks ultimately failed.

Syria deployed troops to Lebanon in 1976, in response to a request from the Lebanese government for Syrian assistance during the Lebanese Civil War. The Arab League agreed to send a peacekeeping force mostly formed by Syrian troops. The initial goals were to counter Israeli pressure in South Lebanon and to help maintain unity among the Lebanese people. Critics allege that this eventually turned into an occupation, which is disputed, especially since Syria entered the country at the request of the Lebanese government. But the main goal of keeping the troops in Lebanon was to protect the west side of Syria from a possible Israeli Conquer. The Syrian presence ended in 2005, largely due to the Hariri assassination and the Cedar Revolution which was suspected to be funded by Israel.

The hostile attitude to Israel meant vocal support for the Palestinians, but that did not translate into friendly relations with their organizations. Hafez al-Assad was always wary of independent Palestinian organizations, as he aimed to bring the Palestinian issue under Syrian control in order to use it as a political tool. He soon developed an implacable animosity towards Yassir Arafat's PLO, against which Syria fought bloody battles in Lebanon.

As Arafat allegedly moved the PLO in a more moderate direction, supposedly seeking compromise with Israel, al-Assad also feared regional isolation, and he resented the PLO underground's operations in Palestinian refugee camps in Syria. Arafat was depicted by Syria as a rogue madman and an American marionette, and after accusing him of supporting the Hama revolt, al-Assad backed the 1983 Abu Musa rebellion inside Arafat's Fatah-movement. A number of unsuccessful Syrian attempts to kill Arafat were also made. In 1999, Assad had his right-hand man, Mustafa Tlass, make an on-the-record statement labelling Arafat "the son of 60,000 whores and 60,000 dogs", in addition to comparing him to a strip-tease dancer and a black cat, calling him a coward and, finally, pointing out that the Palestinian leader was getting uglier.

An effective strategy was undermining Arafat through support for radical groups both outside and inside the PLO. This way, Syria secured some influence over PLO politics, and was also able to literally blow up any attempts at negotiation with the US and Israel through pushing for terrorist attacks. The PLO's As-Sa'iqa faction was and is completely controlled by Syria, and under Hafez, groups such as the PFLP-GC were also turned into clients. In later years, Syria focused on supporting non-PLO Islamist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

Even though Iraq was ruled by another branch of the Baath Party, Assad's relations with Saddam Hussein were extremely strained. Hostile rhetoric was intense, and until Saddam's fall in 2003, Iraq was listed in Syrian passports as one of the two countries no Syrian citizen could visit (the other being Israel). But with the exception of a few border guard skirmishes and mutual support for cross-border raids by opposition groups, no heavy fighting broke out until 1991, when Syria joined the US-led UN coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

Assad was president until his death in 2000 from a heart attack while speaking on the telephone with Lebanese President Émile Lahoud. Assad had originally groomed his son, Basil al-Assad as his successor, but he died in a car accident in 1994. Assad then called back a second son, Bashar, and put him in intensive military and political training. Despite some concerns of unrest within the government, the succession ultimately went smoothly, and Bashar holds office today. Hafez al-Assad is buried together with Basil in a mausoleum in his hometown of Qardaha.

Family connections are presently an important part of Syrian politics. Several members of Hafez al-Assad's closest family have held positions within the government since his ascent to power. Most of the al-Assad and Makhlouf families have also grown tremendously wealthy, and parts of that fortune has reached their Alawite tribe in Qardaha and environs. * Rifaat al-Assad, brother. Formerly a powerful security chief; now in exile in France after attempting a coup in 1984 * Jamil al-Assad, brother. Parliamentarian, commander of a minor militia. * Anisah Makhlouf, wife. * Basil al-Assad, son. Original candidate for succession. Died in 1994. * Dr.Bashar al-Assad, son. President of Syria, ophthalmologist and surgeon. * Majd al-Assad, son. Electrical engineer; widely reported to have mental problems. * Lt. Col. Maher al-Assad, son. Head of Presidential Guard. * Dr. Bushra al-Assad, daughter. Pharmacist. Said to be a strong influence on both Hafez and Bashar, sometimes called the "brain" of Syrian politics. Married to Gen. Assef Shawqat. * Gen. Adnan Makhlouf, cousin of Anisah Makhlouf. Commands the Republican Guard. * Adnan al-Assad, cousin. Leader of "Struggle companies" militia in Damascus. * Muhammad al-Assad, cousin. Another leader of the "Struggle companies". * Gen. Assef Shawqat, son-in-law. Present head of military intelligence.

* Alawites * Baath Party

*Fisk, Robert (2001, 3rd edition). </i>Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-280130-9 (pp. 181-187) *Hitti Philip K. (2002).History of Syria Including Lebanon and Palestine, Vol. 2 (ISBN 1-931956-61-8) *Firzli, Nicola Y. (1973). Al-Baath wa-Lubnân [Arabic only] ("The Baath and Lebanon"), Beirut: Dar-al-Tali'a Books. *Firzli, Nicola Y. (1981). The Iraq-Iran Conflict. Paris: EMA. ISBN 2-86584-002-6 *Friedman, Thomas (1990, British edition). From Beirut to Jerusalem. HarperCollins Publishers. ISBN 0-00-653070-2 (pp. 76-105) *Sallam, Qasim (1980). Al-Baath wal Watan Al-Arabi [Arabic, with French translation] ("The Baath and the Arab Homeland"). Paris: EMA. ISBN 2-86584-003-4 *Seale, Patrick (1988). Asad: The Struggle for the Middle East''. University of California Press. ISBN 0-520-06976-5