Louis Arthur Johnson (January 10, 1891 - April 24, 1966) was the second United States Secretary of Defense, serving in the cabinet of President Harry S. Truman from March 28, 1949 to September 19, 1950.

Born in Roanoke, Virginia, he earned a law degree from the University of Virginia. After graduation he practiced law in Clarksburg, West Virginia; his firm, Steptoe and Johnson, eventually opened offices in Charleston, West Virginia, and Washington, DC. Elected to the West Virginia House of Delegates in 1916, he served as majority floor leader and chairman of the Judiciary Committee. During World War I, Johnson saw action as an Army officer in France. After the war he resumed his law practice and was active in veterans' affairs, helping to found the American Legion and serving as its national commander in 1932-33.

As Assistant Secretary of War 1937 to 1940, Johnson advocated Universal Military education and training, rearmament, and expansion of military aviation. He feuded with isolationist Secretary of War Harry Hines Woodring. In mid-1940, after the fall of France revealed the precarious state of the nation's defenses, Franklin D. Roosevelt fired both of them.

He had no major responsibilities for the war effort, though he did run the American operations of part of the German chemical giant I. G. Farben, under the alien property custodian laws. In 1942 he briefly served as the president's personal representative in India.

In the 1948 campaign Johnson was chief fund-raiser for President Truman's election campaign. Truman chose him to succeed James V. Forrestal early in 1949.

Johnson entered office sharing the president's commitment to achieve further military unification and to reduce budget expenditures on defense forces in favor of other government programs. According to historian Walter LaFeber, Truman was known to approach defense budgetary requests by subtracting from total receipts the amount needed for domestic needs and recurrent operating costs, with any surplus going to the defense budget for that year. From the beginning, Johnson and Truman assumed that the United States' monopoly on the atomic bomb was adequate protection against any and all external threats. Johnson's unwillingness to budget conventional readiness needs for the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps soon caused fierce controversies within the upper ranks of the armed forces. At a press conference the day after he took office, Johnson promised a drastic cut in the number of National Military Establishment boards, committees, and commissions, and added, "To the limit the present law allows, I promise you there will be unification as rapidly as the efficiency of the service permits it." Later, in one of his frequent speeches on unification, Johnson stated that "this nation can no longer tolerate the autonomous conduct of any single service...A waste of the resources of America in spendthrift defense is an invitation to disaster for America."

Johnson promptly began proposing mothballing or scrapping much of the Navy's conventional surface forces. Shortly after his appointment, Johnson had a conversation with Admiral Richard L. Connally, giving a revealing look at his attitudes towards the Navy and Marine Corps and any need for non-nuclear forces:

Admiral, the Navy is on its way out. There’s no reason for having a Navy and a Marine Corps. General Bradley tells me amphibious operations are a thing of the past. We’ll never have any more amphibious operations. That does away with the Marine Corps. And the Air Force can do anything the Navy can do, so that does away with the Navy.

Both Truman and Johnson extended their opposition to the Navy in their treatment of the U.S. Marine Corps. Truman had a well-known dislike of the Marines dating back to his service in World War I, and famously said "The Marine Corps is the Navy's police force and as long as I am President that is what it will remain. They have a propaganda machine that is almost equal to Stalin's." Johnson exploited this ill feeling to reduce or eliminate many Marine Corps' budget requests. Johnson attempted to eliminate Marine Corps aviation by transferring its air assets to other services, and proposed to progressively eliminate the Marine Corps altogether in a series of budget cutbacks and decommissioning of forces. He barred the Marine Corps Commandant from attending Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings in his role of chief of service (including meetings involving Marine readiness or deployments). He even crossed the Marine commandant off the list of those Washington officials authorized a chauffeur and a limousine and off the list of service chiefs for whom a special gun salute was prescribed on ceremonial occasions, and forbade celebration of the Marine Corps birthday. Johnson welcomed the passage of the 1949 amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, telling an American Legion convention that he was "happy to report . . . that 80 percent of the problems that beset unification immediately disappeared when the President signed the bill increasing the authority and the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense." Believing that the amendments would help him promote economy, he estimated that one year after their passage the Defense Department would be achieving savings at the rate of $1 billion per year, and he later claimed that he had attained this goal. One of his slogans was that the taxpayer was going to get "a dollar's worth of defense for every dollar spent" by the Pentagon, an approach that Truman approved.

Johnson did not limit his budget-cutting campaign to the Navy or Marine Corps. Large World War II Army inventories of tanks, communications equipment, personnel carriers, and small arms were scrapped or sold off to other countries instead of being shipped to ordnance for reconditioning and storage. Johnson even resisted budget requests for ammunition, refresher amphibious infantry training, or to mothball a portion of the many serviceable tanks, landing craft, and weapons left over as surplus from World War II. Though the Air Force faced fewer program cancellations and cuts, Johnson refused Air Force requests for a doubling of active air groups until the invasion of Korea, and favored reduction of tactical air force readiness in favor of the strategic nuclear bomber forces.

Johnson's defense cuts, which began on April 23 1949, were accelerated after he announced the cancellation of the 65,000-ton flushdeck aircraft carrier USS United States. The United States Navy had been planning this ship for several years and construction had already begun. Johnson, supported by a majority of the JCS and by President Truman, stressed the need to cut costs. At least by implication, Johnson had scuttled the Navy's hope to participate in strategic nuclear air operations through use of the carrier. Neither the Department of the Navy nor Congress had been consulted in the termination of United States. Abruptly resigning, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan expressed concern about the future of the United States Marine Corps and marine and naval aviation and Johnson's determination to eliminate those services through progressive program cuts.

The cancellation of the supercarrier precipitated a bitter controversy between the Navy and the United States Air Force, the so-called "Revolt of the Admirals." In congressional hearings and other public arenas, the Navy reacted angrily to Johnson's action by openly questioning the ability of the Air Force's latest strategic bomber, the Convair B-36, to penetrate Soviet airspace. The Air Force countered with data supporting the B-36, and minimized the importance of a naval role for surface ships in future major conflicts.

Subsequently declassified material proved the USAF correct in its immediate assessment of the capabilities of the B-36 at the time of the Revolt of the Admirals. At the time, it was indeed virtually invulnerable to interception due to the great height at which it flew. However, the B-36 was a pre-World War II design: by the time it was fully deployed to Air Force active-duty squadrons, the B-36 was hopelessly vulnerable to modern Soviet MiG-15 jet interceptors, aircraft that would greatly surprise U.S. officials when they later appeared over North Korea. The role of heavy bombers evolved into an extension of their role during World War II, support of tactical forces in-theatre. In the long run, Navy arguments for the supercarrier prevailed, though not for the reasons originally cited. A relative failure as a strategic nuclear deterrent, the large aircraft carrier would prove invaluable as an element of conventional rapid deployment forces. Ironically, a successor to the cancelled supercarrier, the radical new USS Forrestal, and later designs, continue in service with the Navy into the 21st century.

However, a more ominous (if less publicized) development than the supercarrier debate was Johnson's steady reduction of force in Navy ships, landing craft, and equipment needed for conventional force readiness. Ship after ship was mothballed from the fleet for lack of operating funds. The United States Navy and Marine Corps, once the world's preeminent amphibious force, lost most of its amphibious capabilities and landing craft which were scrapped or sold as surplus (the remaining craft were reserved solely for Army use in amphibious operations exercises, which did not utilize them in that role)

In June 1949 the House Committee on Armed Services launched an investigation into charges, emanating unofficially from Navy sources, of malfeasance in office against Secretary Johnson and Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington. The hearings also looked into the capability of the B-36, the cancellation of the super-carrier, and JCS procedures on weapon development, and ultimately examined the whole course of unification. Besides disparaging the B-36, Navy representatives questioned the current U.S. military plan for immediate use of atomic weapons against large urban areas when a war started. The Navy argued that such an approach would not harm military targets, and that tactical air power, ground troops, and sea power were the elements necessary to defend the United States and Europe against attack. The Air Force countered that atomic weapons and long-range strategic bombers would deter war, but that if war nevertheless broke out, an immediate atomic offensive against the enemy would contribute to the success of surface actions and reduce U.S. casualties. Strategic bombing, the Air Force contended, provided the major counterbalance to the Soviet Union's vastly superior ground forces.

In its final report, the House Armed Services Committee found no substance to the charges relating to Johnson's and Symington's roles in aircraft procurement. It held that evaluation of the B-36's worth was the responsibility of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, and that the services jointly should not pass judgment on weapons proposed by one service. On cancellation of the supercarrier, the committee questioned the qualifications of the Army and Air Force chiefs of staff, who had testified in support of Johnson's decision, to determine vessels appropriate for the Navy. The committee, disapproving of Johnson's "summary manner" of terminating the carrier and failure to consult congressional committees before acting, stated that "national defense is not strictly an executive department undertaking; it involves not only the Congress but the American people as a whole speaking through their Congress. The committee can in no way condone this manner of deciding public questions."

The committee expressed solid support for effective unification, but stated that "there is such a thing as seeking too much unification too fast" and observed that "there has been a Navy reluctance in the interservice marriage, an over-ardent Army, a somewhat exuberant Air Force . . . . It may well be stated that the committee finds no unification Puritans in the Pentagon."

Finally, the committee condemned the dismissal of Admiral Louis E. Denfeld, the chief of naval operations, who accepted cancellation of the supercarrier but testified critically on defense planning and administration of unification. Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews fired Denfeld on October 27 1949, explaining that he and Denfeld disagreed widely on strategic policy and unification. The House Armed Services Committee concluded that Denfeld's removal was a reprisal because of his testimony and a challenge to effective representative government.

Although Johnson emerged from the Revolt of the Admirals with his reputation intact, the controversy weakened his position with the services and probably with the president. Notwithstanding Johnson's emphasis on unification, it was debatable how far it had really progressed, given the bitter recriminations exchanged by the Air Force and the Navy during the controversy, which went far beyond the initial question of the super-carrier to more fundamental issues of strategic doctrine, service roles and missions, and the authority of the secretary of defense. Moreover, Johnson's ill-conceived budget cutbacks on force readiness would soon bear bitter fruit with the coming of the Korean War.

Momentous international events that demanded difficult national security decisions also marked Johnson's term. The Berlin Crisis ended in May 1949, when the Russians lifted the blockade. Johnson pointed to the Berlin Airlift as a technological triumph important to the future of air cargo transportation and as an example of the fruits of unification. A week after Johnson took office, the United States and 11 other nations signed the North Atlantic Treaty, creating a regional organization that became the heart of a comprehensive collective security system. After initial reservations, Johnson supported the new alliance and the program of military assistance for NATO and other U.S. allies instituted by the Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949).

In August 1949, earlier than U.S. intelligence analysts had anticipated, the Soviet Union tested its first atomic device. This event and the almost concurrent retreat of the Kuomintang regime from mainland China hastened debate within the administration as to whether the United States should develop a hydrogen bomb. Unbelievably, for a time Johnson maintained - despite confirming air samples - that the Soviets had not really tested an atomic device at all. He then argued that perhaps an accidental laboratory explosion had occurred, and that no reassessments of U.S. defense capabilities were needed.

Conceiving the hydrogen bomb as a deterrent rather than an offensive weapon, Truman decided on January 31 1950 to proceed; Johnson supported the president's decision. Truman at the same time directed the secretaries of state and defense to review and reassess U.S. national security policy in the light of the Soviet atomic explosion, the Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War, and the hydrogen bomb decision, and to produce a paper based on their new analysis. Johnson went about this task reluctantly, as he had promised Truman he would hold the line on increased defense spending. He was also upset that the State Department had first taken the lead on the policy assessment and had heavily influenced the contents of the resultant report NSC 68.

Truman was less than enthused about the large defense cost projections for NSC-68 and its implications for existing domestic budgetary spending priorities, and initially sent it back without comment to its authors for further analysis. Although Truman took no immediate formal action on NSC 68, the paper gained considerable support when the North Koreans attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950. Johnson's obstinate attitude toward the State Department role in the preparation of this paper adversely affected his relations with both Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Truman. Although he publicly professed belief that "the advance guard in the campaign for peace that America wages today must be the State Department," his disagreements with Acheson and his restrictions on DoD contacts with the State Department persisted until the realities of the Korean War caused his fall from favor with the White House.

While he had followed faithfully President Truman's lead in imposing economy measures on the armed forces, Johnson received much of the blame for the initial setbacks in Korea. Johnson's failure to adequately plan for U.S. conventional force commitments or even to properly budget for storage of surplus Army and Navy war-fighting material for future use cost the nation dearly after war broke out on the Korean Peninsula.

In an initial response, Truman called for a naval blockade of North Korea, which proved only a 'paper' blockade after the president learned that the U.S. Navy did not have the ships with which to carry out his request. For FY 1951, Johnson supported Truman's recommendation of $13.3 billion, but a month after the fighting in Korea started, the secretary hastily proposed a supplemental appropriation request for $10.5 billion, (an increase of 79%), bringing the total requested to $23.8 billion. Johnson told a House subcommittee when recommending the supplemental that "in the light of the actual fighting that is now in progress, we have reached the point where the military considerations clearly outweigh the fiscal considerations."

It was all too late. U.S. Army infantry forces hastily deployed to Korea proved short of everything needed to repel the well-equipped North Korean forces: ammunition, heavy tanks, even 3.5-inch shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launchers needed to penetrate the armor of Soviet-supplied tanks. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union had kept its large World War II surplus inventories in readiness, and lavishly supplied the North Korean Army with tanks, combat aircraft, and artillery. Faced with the results of previous budgets, Army officials found themselves frantically recovering rusted Sherman tanks from World War II Pacific battlefields and reconditioning them for shipment to Korea in a frantic effort to repel North Korean advances. Several World War II-era tanks (M-26 90mm Pershings) had been mounted as a memorial at Fort Knox and were removed from their pedestals and hastily shipped to Korea. The Navy, now short of landing craft, had to keep its existing boats in constant operation, causing frequent breakdowns. While awaiting U.S. ground intervention, the lightly-armed South Korean Army and its U.S. advisors found themselves under attack from North Korean aircraft and waves of well-trained infantry equipped with Soviet tanks. Having used most of its appropriation to build large atomic bombers, the Air Force found itself without modern jet attack aircraft with sufficient loiter capability over the Korean peninsula, and Air Force commanders were forced to take F-51 (P-51) propeller-driven aircraft out of mothballs. Even those pilots flying existing U.S. jet interceptor aircraft from Japan such as the F-80 found themselves completely outclassed by Soviet MiG-15 fighter jets.

U.S. infantry forces deployed from Japan also lacked adequate training for the intense ground combat in Korea. The Eighth Army and U.S. occupation forces had long curtailed war exercises and training schedules to reduce costs and to reduce compensation paid to Japanese farmers (who demanded payment for tanks and trucks that ruined their fields on exercises). Because of the weakness of roads and bridges in Japan, where it had been based, the Eighth Army was equipped with only light tanks, and was not authorized to maintain inventories of heavy tanks even in storage. By June 1950, the Army's 'battle-ready' infantry divisions were just 93 percent of an authorized strength already far reduced from a war strength of 18,900. Training and unit cohesion suffered from an annual turnover that exceeded 40 percent, and both equipment and ready-stored ammunition were in poor condition.

As a consequence, U.S. and U.N. forces were rapidly pushed down the Korean peninsula in the summer of 1950 in a steady series of retreats and withdrawals, losing considerable numbers of soldiers who were cut off and taken captive (most were summarily executed). Reservists and new inductees called to duty found themselves short everything from uniforms to rifles and ammunition. Ironically, only the U.S. Marine Corps, whose commanders had thoughtfully stored all of their World War II surplus equipment and weapons, proved ready for immediate deployment, though they still were understrength and in desperate need of suitable landing craft to practice amphibious operations (Johnson had transferred most of the remaining craft to the Navy and reserved them for use in training Army units) The U.S. Navy's aircraft carriers were the only effective airfields available to U.N. forces, as they could not be overrun by the land-based North Koreans. U.S. reverses in Korea and the continued priority accorded to European security necessitated rapid, substantive changes in defense policy including a long-term expansion of the armed forces and more emphasis on the military buildup of U.S. allies. Truman decided that these tasks required new leadership in the Department of Defense. When Johnson resigned at Truman's request on September 19, 1950, the president quickly replaced him with General George C. Marshall.

Johnson returned to his law practice, which he pursued until his death in Washington at the age of 75. In his last speech as secretary of defense the day before he left office, Johnson observed: "When the hurly burly's done and the battle is won I trust the historian will find my record of performance creditable, my services honest and faithful commensurate with the trust that was placed in me and in the best interests of peace and our national defense."

*Blair, Clay, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953, Naval Institute Press (2003) *Krulak, Victor H. (Lt. Gen.), First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps, Naval Institute Press (1999) *LaFeber, Walter, America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1980, 7th edition New York: McGraw-Hill (1993) *Lane, Peter J., Steel for Bodies: Ammunition Readiness During the Korean War, Master's Thesis: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (2003) * McFarland, Keith D. and Roll, David L., Louis Johnson And the Arming of America: The Roosevelt And Truman Years (2005) *Summers, Harry G. (Lt. Col.), The Korean War: A Fresh Perspective (1996) * Wolk, Herman S., The Blueprint for Cold War Defense, Air Force Magazine (March 2000)

* Original public domain biography from DoD *Louis Johnson on Find-A-Grave *Army shortages in the Korean War *Johnson's attitude towards the U.S. Marine Corps

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